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KANSAS V. GLOVER: GRANTING LAW ENFORCEMENT 
FURTHER DISCRETION TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATORY 
STOPS 
NICOLE FULLEM* 
In Kansas v. Glover,1 the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed 
the reasonable suspicion doctrine and considered “whether a police officer 
violates the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investigative traffic stop after 
running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner of that 
vehicle has a revoked driver’s license.”2  The Court’s decision turned on 
whether it was common sense to assume that the driver of a vehicle is also 
its registered owner.3  The Court held that, for purposes of an investigatory 
stop, there is a presumption that the registered owner of a vehicle is driving 
the vehicle.4   
In what could have been an opportunity to clarify the reasonable 
suspicion doctrine, the Court instead further blurred the line of reasonable 
suspicion by departing from precedent and failing to balance the 
governmental intrusion of a traffic stop against an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment privacy interest.5  Although the Court correctly acknowledged 
that officers may rely on commonsense inferences, the Court wrongfully 
ignored law enforcement’s primary responsibility––investigating potential 
criminal activity and traffic violations––and inevitably discouraged law 
enforcement officers from doing so.6  Most importantly, the Court failed to 
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 1. 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020). 
 2. Id. at 1186. 
 3. Id. at 1189. 
 4. Id. at 1186. 
 5. See infra Section IV.A. 
 6. See infra Section IV.B. 
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recognize the negative implications its ruling has on disadvantaged 
communities.7  Ultimately, Glover further erodes the Fourth Amendment.8 
I.  THE CASE 
On April 28, 2016, Deputy Mark Mehrer was patrolling in Douglas 
County, Kansas when he observed a 1995 Chevrolet truck.9  Although 
Mehrer did not observe any traffic infractions, he decided to run the Kansas 
license plate.10  After running the plate through the Kansas Department of 
Revenue’s file service, he learned that the truck was registered to an 
individual with a revoked driver’s license, Charles Glover, Jr.11  Mehrer did 
not attempt to identify the driver of the truck but, instead, he assumed that 
the registered owner of the truck was also the driver.12  Subsequently, he 
initiated a traffic stop based solely on the information that he learned through 
the file service—the registered owner’s driver’s license had been revoked.13  
The traffic stop confirmed that Glover was driving the vehicle with a revoked 
license, and Glover was charged with driving as a habitual violator.14  Glover 
filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the stop, reasoning that 
Mehrer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.15  
The Kansas trial court granted Glover’s motion to suppress all evidence 
seized during the stop.16  The State appealed, and the Kansas Court of 
Appeals reversed, finding that Mehrer properly initiated the stop because 
                                                          
 7. See infra Section IV.C. 
 8. See infra Section IV.A–IV.C. 
 9. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1186–87; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-285(a)(3) (2021) (“The term ‘habitual violator’ 
means any resident or nonresident person who, within the immediately preceding five years, has 
been convicted in this or any other state: (a) Three or more times of: . . . (3) driving while the 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state has been canceled, 
suspended or revoked, as prohibited by [Section] 8-262, and amendments thereto, or while such 
person’s privilege to obtain a driver’s license is suspended or revoked pursuant to [Section] 8-252a, 
and amendments thereto, or, as prohibited by any ordinance of any city in this state, any resolution 
of any county in this state or any law of another state which is in substantial conformity with those 
statutes . . . .”). 
 15. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187. 
 16. Id.  The trial court found that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe the driver 
of the vehicle was the vehicle’s owner whose license was revoked.  State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 
67 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020).  The trial court judge 
relied on human experience and found that it “was not ‘reasonable for an officer to infer that the 
registered owner of a vehicle is also the driver of the vehicle absent any information to the 
contrary.’”  Id. 
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“there were specific and articulable facts from which the officer’s 
commonsense inference gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver 
was committing a violation.”17  Glover appealed, and the Kansas Supreme 
Court reversed the Kansas Court of Appeals’ ruling, explaining that Mehrer 
did not have reasonable suspicion because his assumption that Glover was 
driving the vehicle amounted to “only a hunch” that Glover was engaging in 
criminal activity.18  The court reasoned that Mehrer had some reason to think 
Glover was driving the vehicle, but he needed reasonable suspicion that 
Glover was, in fact, the individual driving the vehicle.19  The court rejected 
the State’s “owner-is-the-driver presumption . . . because it relieves the State 
of its burden by eliminating the officer’s need to develop specific and 
articulable facts to satisfy the State’s burden on the determinative issue of 
whether the registered owner is driving the vehicle, not whether the vehicle 
is being driven.”20  The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 
to determine “whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by 
initiating an investigative traffic stop after running a vehicle’s license plate 
and learning the registered owner has a revoked driver’s license.”21 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Terry v. Ohio22 was the first case to establish the reasonable suspicion 
doctrine.23  In this decision, the Court recognized that some brief police 
intrusions were not subject to the warrant requirement and the probable cause 
standard normally required by the Fourth Amendment.24  The Court 
emphasized reasonable suspicion varies depending on the facts and 
                                                          
 17. State v. Glover, 400 P.3d 182, 188 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d, 422 P.3d 64 (Kan. 2018), 
rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020).  Specifically, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
held that “a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of a vehicle to 
investigate whether the driver has a valid driver’s license if, when viewed in conjunction with all of 
the other information available to the officer at the time of the stop, the officer knows the registered 
owner of the vehicle has a suspended license and the officer is unaware of any other evidence or 
circumstances from which an inference could be drawn that the registered owner is not the driver 
of the vehicle.”  Id. 
 18. Glover, 422 P.3d at 66.  The trial court reasoned that the State “must affirmatively produce 
evidence showing the officer rationally inferred criminal activity based on specific and articulable 
facts.”  Id. at 72. 
 19. Id. at 68. 
 20. Id. at 70. 
 21. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020). 
 22. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 23. See id. at 30–31 (holding the search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if an 
“officer observes unusual conduct which leads [them] reasonably to conclude in light of [their] 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot”). 
 24. See id. at 20 (“But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift 
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically 
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”). 
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circumstances surrounding each individual case.25  After Terry, lower courts 
developed a broad definition of what the reasonable suspicion standard 
requires.26  Section II.A discusses the Fourth Amendment and the reasonable 
suspicion exception to the warrant requirement.27  Section II.B analyzes the 
development of the reasonable suspicion standard in the courts.28  Finally, 
Section II.C looks at the continuing conflict between the Fourth 
Amendment’s individual privacy interest and an officer’s public safety 
interest.29  
A. The Reasonable Suspicion Exception 
The Fourth Amendment, in part, protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.30  It requires law enforcement officers to either have a 
search warrant or, in the absence of a warrant, conduct the search “within a 
specific exception to the warrant requirement.”31  However, as the Court 
acknowledged in Terry, a brief warrantless search or seizure supported only 
by a police officer’s “on-the-spot observations” is not categorically 
prohibited if it is reasonable.32  Specifically, the Court noted the distinction 
between a search and seizure and a Terry Stop and Terry Frisk.33  The Terry 
Stop is a brief investigative detention of an individual when there is 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.34  Subsequently, if an 
officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual “may be armed and 
presently dangerous,” then an officer may conduct a limited search, which is 
known as a Terry Frisk.35  The Court made clear that “police can stop and 
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a 
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 
‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”36 
                                                          
 25. See id. at 30 (“Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts.”). 
 26. See infra Section II.B. 
 27. See infra Section II.A. 
 28. See infra Section II.B. 
 29. See infra Section II.C. 
 30. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 31. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). 
 32. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
 33. Id. at 16. 
 34. Id. at 30.  The Court found that Terry stops are less invasive than a seizure.  Id. at 16. 
 35. Id. at 30.  The Court distinguished Terry frisks from a search.  Id. at 16. 
 36. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).  The Terry 
Court held that a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “where a police officer observes 
unusual conduct which leads [them] reasonably to conclude in light of [their] experience that 
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Thus, the standard introduced in Terry, known as the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard, is less demanding than the probable cause standard that 
is discussed in the text of the Fourth Amendment.37  Reasonable suspicion 
“can be established with information that is different in quantity or content 
than” probable cause and “can arise from information that is less reliable 
than” what is required for probable cause.38  While reasonable suspicion need 
not be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, the level of suspicion must 
be more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”39  
Although the reasonable suspicion standard is less than the probable cause 
standard, the police conduct is still “tested by the Fourth Amendment’s 
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.”40  Thus, the 
concepts behind the warrant procedure and the requirement of probable cause 
are still relevant in the reasonableness context.41 
The reasonableness assessment balances the weight of the government’s 
interest, supported by rational inferences from specific and articulable facts, 
and a citizen’s constitutionally protected interests.42  The facts must be 
judged against an objective standard— a simple good faith part on the officer 
is not enough.43  Like probable cause, the inferences underlying a reasonable 
suspicion must be supported by “probabilities” and other understandings of 
common experience.44  Thus, although the reasonableness standard is lower 
than the probable cause standard, both standards depend upon the facts of 
each case.45  There is no categorical rule.46 
When a court assesses whether an officer had the requisite reasonable 
suspicion to seize a driver, the court consistently relies on the “totality of the 
circumstances—the whole picture.”47  A court does not analyze each 
individual circumstance separately because each fact, individually, might 
                                                          
criminal activity may be afoot . . . and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to 
dispel [their] reasonable fear for [their] own or others’ safety[.]”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 37. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 38. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
 39. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 40. Id. at 20. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 21. 
 43. Id. at 21–22.  The objective standard asks, “would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the 
action taken was appropriate?”  Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
 44. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).  
 45. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417; see also id. at 419 (holding that the trial court considered all the 
circumstances, including the officer’s familiarity with the area, his knowledge of the practice of 
those who smuggle aliens, and the clues that had developed for two months); United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (explaining all the facts taken together warranted the conclusion 
that the individual was smuggling narcotics). 
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warrant a conclusion of innocent behavior, but taken together the facts might 
suggest criminal activity.48  Consideration of all of the facts matter because 
some actions may appear innocent “at a certain time or in a certain place,” 
but may also signal “criminal activity under different circumstances.”49  
Accordingly, to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, a court must 
look at all the facts taken together.50 
When considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court 
recognizes that officers may draw inferences from their professional 
experience and common sense.51  The Court has emphasized that police 
officers may draw inferences that might otherwise “elude an untrained 
person” due to their investigatory expertise.52  Likewise, an officer’s 
expertise may make some inferences unreasonable that would otherwise 
appear reasonable to a layperson.53  Additionally, the Court has explained 
that the reasonableness assessment may be based on an officer’s 
commonsense judgments.54  An officer’s reasonable suspicion does not need 
to be correct—it only needs to have been reached by a “reasonably prudent 
man” in the police officer’s position.55  This assessment may include an 
                                                          
 48. Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 104, 816 A.2d 901, 904 (Md. 2003); see also Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (agreeing an individual’s flight from officers is not necessarily 
indicative of ongoing criminal activity and by itself may be lawful); Terry, 392 U.S. at 6, 22 
(observing that the facts individually supported innocent behavior but taken together, they suggested 
that the individuals were casing the store for a robbery). 
 49. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008); see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275–76 
(noting that a defendant’s behavior may be completely normal in one situation, while completely 
unusual in another circumstance). 
 50. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. 
 51. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273  
 52. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418. 
 53. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5 (explaining that the officer had many years of experience and 
developed routine habits of observation over the years); Cortez, 449 U.S. at 419 (noting that it was 
of critical importance that the officers were familiar with the crossing point and based on their 
experience they were aware that it was common practice for persons to lead aliens through the desert 
to be picked up by a vehicle); United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 414 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
reasonable suspicion determination demands that facts—whether seemingly innocent or obviously 
incriminating—be assessed in light of their effect on the respective officer’s perception of the 
situation at hand.”). 
 54. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014) (concluding that it is common sense 
to find that certain driving behaviors are sound indicia of drunk driving); see also Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (holding the officer was justified in using their common-
sense judgment of inferring that the individual was engaging in criminal activity when they fled the 
area of heavy narcotics and demonstrated nervous, evasive behavior). 
 55. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (citations 
omitted) (explaining reasonable suspicion “as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting 
the person stopped of criminal activity . . . and probable cause to search as existing where the known 
facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found”). 
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officer’s “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”56  
Ultimately, when the Court determines whether an officer “acted reasonably 
in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable 
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.”57   
B.  Development of the Reasonable Suspicion Doctrine in the Courts 
after Terry v. Ohio 
The facts in Terry prompted the Court to hold that an officer can stop 
an individual if there is reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot 
and the officer can articulate the facts that caused the officer’s suspicion.58  
Although the reasonable suspicion standard is lower than probable cause, 
courts have recognized that the reasonable suspicion standard is not carte 
blanche for law enforcement officers.59 
Officers must point to and explain specific facts to demonstrate 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.60  Thus, the courts must consider the 
inferences drawn from the officer and not substitute the courts judgment on 
the facts.61  The officer must be able to articulate some type of logic that the 
court can defer to,62 particularly in situations where an individual might 
perceive the activity to be suspicious in one situation but completely innocent 
                                                          
 56. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. 
 57. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 58. Id. at 21.  The officer observed two individuals standing together on the street corner for an 
extended period of time.  Id. at 23.  The officer was unable to say exactly what drew his eye to these 
two people, but he had thirty-nine years of experience and was assigned to patrol this area for 
shoplifters and pickpockets for almost thirty years.  Id. at 5.  Based on his experience and the 
foregoing observations, the officer suspected the two individuals of robbing the store and feared 
they may have a gun.  Id. at 6. 
 59. Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 508, 970 A.2d 894, 904 (Md. 2009). 
 60. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981) (concluding the officers had 
reasonable suspicion when they articulated multiple facts and clues that supported the deductions 
and inferences drawn about the individuals); see also United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248 
(4th Cir. 2011) (“The Government must also be able to either articulate why a particular behavior 
is suspicious or logically demonstrate, given the surrounding circumstances, that the behavior is 
likely to be indicative of some more sinister activity than may appear at first glance.”); see also 
Crosby, 408 Md. at 508, 970 A.2d at 904 (explaining the officer must be able to articulate “how the 
observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all of the other circumstances known to the officer” 
indicated criminal activity was afoot). 
 61. See United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 414 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that the trial court 
did not give “‘due weight’ to the inferences drawn by” the officer and instead “substituted its 
‘innocent’ take on the facts for” the officers’ perspective). 
 62. See Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 111, 816 A.2d 901, 908 (Md. 2003) (“[I]f the officer 
seeks to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion based on that conduct, the officer ordinarily must 
offer some explanation of why he or she regarded the conduct as suspicious; otherwise, there is no 
ability to review the officer’s action.”). 
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in another situation.63  Without any logic to defer to, the court does not have 
the ability to review the officer’s actions.64  Consequently, the Court has 
declined to find reasonable suspicion in circumstances where the officer 
cannot articulate facts to justify the investigatory stop.65  In Delaware v. 
Prouse,66 the officer stopped an automobile, smelled marijuana smoke while 
approaching the vehicle, and seized the marijuana, which was in plain view 
on the car floor.67  The officer’s only explanation for pulling the individual 
over was “to check the driver’s license and registration.”68  The Court held 
that pulling over a vehicle and detaining its driver to verify the driver’s 
compliance with licensing and registration laws, without facts suggesting a 
violation of the law, is “unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”69 
When looking at the totality of the circumstances, courts must not view 
“each individual circumstance for separate consideration” because one 
factor, by itself, may constitute completely innocent behavior.70  Only when 
the court looks at facts and inferences in conjunction with other factors may 
they amount to reasonable suspicion.71  In Illinois v. Wardlow,72 an individual 
fled on foot after seeing police officers patrolling in an area known for heavy 
narcotics trafficking.73  The Court recognized that there may be innocent 
reasons for an individual to flee police and an individual’s presence in an area 
of heavy narcotics trafficking, alone, is not enough to support reasonable 
                                                          
 63. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276 (2002) (explaining the officer is entitled to 
make the assessment in light of his training and experience when the situation indicates behavior 
that an officer could interpret differently depending on the surrounding circumstances). 
 64. Ransome, 373 Md. at 111, 816 A.2d at 908. 
 65. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (declining to find reasonable suspicion when 
the officer “was unable to point to any facts supporting” their conclusion that the situation appeared 
suspicious); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (explaining individuals traveling 
“on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at 
the unbridled discretion of police officers”); United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 252–53 (4th 
Cir. 2015) (holding reasonable suspicion did not exist when “[t]he deputies neither articulated how 
[the suspect’s] particular behavior was suspicious nor logically demonstrated that [the suspect’s] 
behavior was indicative of some more sinister activity than appeared at first glance”); Crosby, 408 
Md. at 515, 970 A.2d at 908 (holding that the officer’s belief was unreasonable when the officer 
was “[w]ithout particularized and objective reasons that support[ed] a different interpretation of 
what he observed”). 
 66. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 67. Id. at 650. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 663. 
 70. Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 104, 816 A.2d 901, 904 (Md. 2003); see also Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal 
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the 
person is committing a crime.”); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (“Any one of these 
factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel.”). 
 71. United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 72. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 73. Id. at 121. 
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suspicion.74  However, the Court considered the totality of the circumstances 
and noted that the location, unprovoked flight, and the individual’s nervous 
behavior gave the officer reasonable suspicion to stop them.75  Thus, the 
Court has explicitly rejected the idea that a single factor can justify 
reasonable suspicion for an officer to pursue an investigatory stop.76   
C.  Conflict Between an Individual’s Privacy Interest and an Officer’s 
Public Safety Interest 
As established in Terry, the reasonable suspicion doctrine balances law 
enforcement’s intrusion on an individual’s privacy against governmental 
safety interests.77  One of the main governmental interests is “effective crime 
prevention and detection.”78  However, as the Terry Court explained, even a 
non-intrusive physical pat down is an “intrusion upon cherished personal 
security” worthy of protection.79  Thus, courts must also consider the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on individual rights.80  In Prouse, the Court 
balanced the governmental interest in conducting traffic stops against the 
individual’s privacy interest.81  While recognizing the practical challenges of 
ensuring that all vehicles are properly inspected and that their drivers are 
licensed, the Court ruled that random highway inspection checks are 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.82  The Court agreed that states have an 
interest in ensuring their highway safety laws are followed to protect their 
citizens on roadways.83  However, individuals also have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when traveling in a vehicle because it is a typical and 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 124–25. 
 75. Id. at 124. 
 76. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–86 (1975) (emphasizing the 
officer’s reliance on one factor––the Mexican ancestry of the occupatants––did not justify the 
officer’s reasonable belief that they were non-U.S. citizens); United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 1134, 
1141 (10th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that the decision to use a highway exit after seeing a drug 
checkpoint may be a valid, persuasive factor in the analysis, but standing alone it is insufficient to 
justify even a brief investigatory detention of a vehicle). 
 77. See Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967) (explaining that there is “no ready 
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the 
invasion which the search [or seizure] entails”).  
 78. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).  The Supreme Court explained that this interest 
“underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even 
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”  Id. 
 79. Id. at 25. 
 80. Id. at 24.  
 81. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
 82. Id. at 658–59. 
 83. Id. at 658. 
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necessary mode of transportation.84  In balancing these two interests, the 
Court reasoned that the state’s interest in slightly improved highway safety 
was outweighed by the substantial privacy invasion of officers searching 
“every occupant of every vehicle on the roads.”85  
Courts have analyzed many cases and numerous facts involving whether 
an officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.86  Before the Glover 
decision, the Supreme Court had only infrequently analyzed cases in which 
a traffic stop was initiated with very limited facts and no officer testimony.87  
Thus, the cases discussed throughout this section provide insight and 
guidance for specific types of inferences and factors officers may draw upon 
that may help guide courts in determining whether an officer has the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.88 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Kansas v. Glover, the Court considered whether it is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment for an officer to infer that the owner-is-the-driver and 
subsequently conduct an investigatory stop if a vehicle’s registered owner 
has a revoked license.89  The Court explained that such a scenario does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment and, absent information to the contrary, it is 
reasonable for a police officer to assume that a vehicle’s registered owner is 
driving the vehicle.90 
The Court began by reasoning it “cannot reasonably demand scientific 
certainty where . . . none exists,” and rather, the courts “must permit officers 
to make ‘commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.’”91  
Subsequently, the Court explained that Mehrer drew a commonsense 
inference and had more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.92  The 
Court permitted this inference because of three facts: (1) Mehrer observed an 
individual operating a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 
295ATJ; (2) the registered owner of the truck had a revoked license; and (3) 
                                                          
 84. Id. at 662.  But see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (explaining there is a 
diminished expectation of privacy surrounding the automobile because “its function is 
transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects”). 
 85. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661. 
 86. See supra Section II.B. 
 87. See supra Section II.B. 
 88. See supra Section II.B. 
 89. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020). 
 90. Id.  In other words, a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer 
initiates an investigative stop after running a vehicle’s license and learning that the registered owner 
has a revoked license.  Id. 
 91. Id. at 1188 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 92. Id. 
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the model of the truck matched the observed vehicle. 93  The Court rejected 
the argument that the registered owner is not always the driver because that 
logic could apply to all reasonable inferences.94 
The Court further relied on empirical studies to reject the idea that 
Glover’s revoked license negated a finding of reasonable suspicion.95  These 
empirical studies demonstrated that drivers with revoked licenses usually 
continue to drive and therefore pose safety risks to pedestrians.96  
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the Kansas license-revocation scheme 
supports the reasonableness of Mehrer’s inference that an individual may 
continue to drive with a revoked license because drivers have already shown 
disregard for the law.97 
Glover raised two arguments as to why Mehrer’s inference was 
unreasonable.98  First, Glover argued that the inference was not grounded in 
Mehrer’s law enforcement training or experience.99  The Court rejected this 
argument, explaining that “[t]he inference that the driver of a car is its 
registered owner does not require any specialized training; rather, it is a 
reasonable inference made by ordinary people on a daily basis.”100  Further, 
“reasonable suspicion is an ‘abstract’ concept that cannot be reduced to ‘a 
neat set of legal rules.’”101  The Court then noted the implications of requiring 
officers to point to specific training materials or field experiences, explaining 
that it would place a burden on officers and inevitably “tie a traffic stop’s 
                                                          
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  The Court explained that even though the registered owner of a vehicle is not always 
the driver of the vehicle, the reasonable suspicion inquiry does not have to be perfect because the 
reasonable suspicion inquiry “‘falls considerably short’ of [fifty-one] percent accuracy.”  Id.  
(quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1188–89; see KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-255(a)(1)–(4) (2021) (stating the State is 
authorized to revoke a person’s driving privileges if the person “(1) [h]as been convicted with such 
frequency of serious offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles as to 
indicate a disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highways; 
(2) has been convicted of three or more moving traffic violations committed on separate occasions 
within a [twelve]-month period; (3) is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle; (4) has been convicted 
of a moving traffic violation, committed at a time when the person’s driving privileges were 
restricted, suspended, or revoked”). 
 98. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1189–90. 
 99. Id. at 1189.  Glover argued that the stop was unreasonable because Mehrer did not draw 
upon his training or experience to develop inferences that would justify the traffic stop.  Id. 
 100. Id.  The Court stated that nothing in its Fourth Amendment precedent supports the notion 
that an officer can draw inferences based on knowledge gained only through law enforcement 
experience or training.  Id. 
 101. Id. at 1190 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). 
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validity to the officer’s length of service.”102  Second, Glover argued that a 
holding for the State would “eviscerate” the Court’s “specific and articulable 
facts” requirement by relying “exclusively on probabilities.”103  The Court 
denied this argument, explaining that officers are like jurors in that they may 
rely on probabilities in the reasonable suspicion context.104  Thus, the Court 
concluded that combining database information provided to the officer and 
commonsense judgments of the officer is “fully consonant with this Court’s 
Fourth Amendment precedents.”105 
Lastly, the Court emphasized the narrow scope of the holding, noting 
that the presence of additional facts in this case might have dispelled 
reasonable suspicion.106  The Court then concluded by clarifying that the 
officer’s actions must be justified and courts must consider the totality of the 
circumstances in light of the facts of each case.107  In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Kagan reiterated the narrow scope of the holding and reached the 
same conclusion as the majority by relying solely on the fact that Mehrer 
knew the registered owner had a tendency for breaking driving laws.108  
Justice Kagan further emphasized that the license revocation scheme in 
Kansas required “serious or repeated driving violations,” and therefore, 
Mehrer’s inference was reasonable.109  
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority 
ignored key foundations of reasonable suspicion and reduced the State’s 
burden of proof.110  Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority’s view on 
the reasonable suspicion inquiry and instead explained that the reasonable 
suspicion inquiry deliberately avoids judicial common sense, does not 
accommodate the average person’s intuition, and favors viewing “‘the facts 
through the lens of police experience and expertise.’”111  Specifically, she 
noted “[i]t is the reasonable officer’s assessment, not the ordinary person’s—
or judge’s—judgment, that matters.”112  When looking at reasonable 
                                                          
 102. Id.  The Court noted that their reasoning does not minimizing the significant role that 
specialized training and experience plays, but simply notes that it is not a requirement in every 
instance.  Id. 
 103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1191.  Specifically, the Court explained that there may be no reasonable suspicion in 
a situation where “an officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but 
observes that the driver is in her mid-twenties . . . .”  Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1194 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 109. Id.  Justice Kagan explained that the case may have been different if the driver’s license 
was suspended instead of revoked.  Id. at 1192. 
 110. Id. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 1195 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). 
 112. Id. at 1195. 
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suspicion, she emphasized that “past cases have considered the ‘totality of 
the circumstances—the whole picture,’”113 however this case “rests on just 
one key fact: that the vehicle was owed by someone with a revoked 
license.”114  Additionally, she explained that the State has the burden of 
“articulat[ing] factors supporting its reasonable suspicion, usually through a 
trained agent.”115  Therefore, she argued that the majority flipped the burden 
of proof and “permits Kansas police officers to effectuate roadside stops 
whenever they lack ‘information negating an inference’ that a vehicle’s 
unlicensed owner is its driver.”116  Finally, she noted some implications of 
the majority’s holding, specifically emphasizing that reasonable suspicion 
may now be found “based on nothing more than a demographic profile.”117 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Kansas v. Glover, the Supreme Court held “when [an] officer lacks 
information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle, 
the stop is reasonable.”118  The Court’s holding takes an additional step 
towards granting law enforcement more deference in conducting 
investigatory stops.119  The Court erroneously departed from precedent by 
relying on an officer’s assumptions instead of inferences and failing to 
consider an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest.120  The Court 
ignored law enforcement’s primary responsibility to further investigate 
potential criminal activity and traffic violations and importantly, discouraged 
them from further doing so.121  Ultimately, the Court failed to consider the 
negative implications of this rule, specifically how it will disproportionately 
affect individuals in disadvantaged communities.122 
A. The Supreme Court Departed from the Reasonable Suspicion 
Standard Originally Established in Terry v. Ohio 
In Glover, the Court created a presumption that the driver of a vehicle 
is also the registered owner of the vehicle if there is no information to negate 
the officer’s inference.123  This presumption is contrary to what the 
                                                          
 113. Id. at 1194 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1195 (quoting Id. at 1186–87 (majority opinion)).  
 117. Id. at 1197. 
 118. Id. at 1186 (majority opinion). 
 119. See infra Section IV.A–IV.C. 
 120. See infra Section IV.A. 
 121. See infra Section IV.B. 
 122. See infra Section IV.C. 
 123. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
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reasonable suspicion doctrine previously required.124  Despite correctly 
finding that officers may draw upon commonsense inferences, the Court 
erroneously substituted assumptions for inferences and implied that an 
officer’s assumption alone was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.125  
Additionally, the Court failed to require Mehrer to articulate any logic as to 
why he developed reasonable suspicion.126  Lastly, the Court departed from 
considering an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest.127  As a 
result, the Court further blurred the already unsettled reasonable suspicion 
standard and made investigatory stops presumptively reasonable.128   
1. The Court Erroneously Labeled an Assumption an Inference and 
Permitted Law Enforcement to Assume Individuals Are Engaging 
in Crime 
The Court ignored the crucial difference between an assumption and an 
inference and, in doing so, implied officers are permitted to assume 
individuals are engaging in crime.129  Reasonable suspicion requires officers 
to draw upon their commonsense inferences, not assumptions, to show 
specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot.130  An assumption 
is a belief that is accepted as true without proof, whereas an inference is a 
conclusion based on a premise and evidence.131  Mehrer’s inference that 
Glover had a revoked license was supported, ex post facto, by the evidence 
in the database;132 however, Mehrer’s assumption that Glover was also the 
driver of the vehicle was supported by no evidence or proof at the time of the 
                                                          
 124. See infra Section IV.A.1–3. 
 125. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 126. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 127. See infra Section IV.A.3. 
 128. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1197 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the 
majority’s logic “has thus made the [s]tate’s task all but automatic” and that “[t]hat has never been 
the law, and it never should be”); Dennis J. Buffone, Traffic Stops, Reasonable Suspicion, and the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: A State Constitutional Analysis, 69 U. PITTSBURGH L. REV. 331, 
332 (2007) (noting the originally established Terry standard left “no doubt that the exception was 
to be construed and applied in only the narrowest of contexts” but as the lower courts applied it, the 
standard became blurred considerably). 
 129. See State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 69 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. 
Ct. 1183 (2020) (explaining the dictionary defines “an assumption [as] ‘a statement accepted or 
supposed true without proof or demonstration’” and “an inference is ‘[s]omething inferred; a 
conclusion based on a premise,’ and to infer is ‘[t]o conclude from evidence; deduce’ or ‘[t]o have 
as a logical consequence’” (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting American 
Heritage Dictionary, 80, 673 (1969))). 
 130. See supra notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text. 
 131. Glover, 422 P.3d at 69. 
 132. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187 (majority opinion) (noting the files indicated that Glover had 
a revoked driver’s license in the State of Kansas). 
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stop.133  To the contrary, Mehrer based his assumption on another 
assumption: that most individuals driving a car are also the owner of the 
car.134  Mehrer failed to offer any specific articulated logic to support his 
assumption, and the Court did not require him to do so.135  Instead, the Court 
suggested that Mehrer’s assumption satisfied the requisite “commonsense 
inference[s]”136 for the reasonable suspicion inquiry and, consequently, 
implied that officers may assume individuals are engaging in criminal 
behavior.137 
The Court created a presumption of “general criminal inclination” by 
allowing Mehrer to assume the owner is the driver and subsequently 
assuming that the owner is disregarding state law by continuing to drive on a 
revoked license.138  However, an individual with a revoked driver’s license 
does not commit a crime by owning a vehicle, and an individual with a 
revoked license does not commit a crime by allowing another licensed driver 
to use their registered vehicle.139  A crime occurs only when the unlicensed 
driver operates the vehicle.140  Therefore, the mere presence of a truck on the 
road, even if the truck is owned by an unlicensed driver, is not a reasonable 
basis for suspecting criminal activity.141  This presumption is contrary to the 
Fourth Amendment standard, our constitutional scheme, and a system of 
fairness—citizens are presumed to be “engaged in lawful activities” and 
                                                          
 133. See id. (“Based solely on the information that the registered owner of the truck was revoked, 
Deputy Mehrer initiated a traffic stop.”). 
 134. See id. at 1187 (“The court further explained that Deputy Mehrer’s ‘hunch’ involved 
‘applying and stacking unstated assumptions that are unreasonable without further factual basis,’ 
namely, that ‘the registered owner was likely the primary driver of the vehicle’ and that the ‘the 
owner will likely disregard the suspension or revocation order and continue to drive.’” (quoting 
State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 68–70 (2018))). 
 135. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1186 (“We hold that when the officer lacks information negating 
an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is reasonable.”). 
 136. Id.. at 1188. 
 137. State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 72 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 
1183 (2020).  It is not always reasonable to assume that all individuals are following the law, 
however, “Deputy Mehrer did not observe any traffic infractions, and did not attempt to identify the 
driver [of] the truck.”  Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 138. Glover, 422 P.3d at 70. 
 139. Id. at 68.  The activity must be “specific enough to permit an innocent citizen to be 
differentiated from one who is actually guilty.”  Margaret Anne Hoehl, Usual Suspects Beware: 
“Walk, Don’t Run” Through Dangerous Neighborhoods, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 136 (2001). 
 140. Glover, 422 P.3d at 68. 
 141. See e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The fact that appellant was in a 
neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding the appellant 
himself was engaged in criminal conduct.”); see Hoehl, supra note 139, at 136–37 (noting that the 
characteristic considered “must be more often present when a crime is being committed than when 
it is not; otherwise, it has no probative value”). 
 
2021] GRANTING LAW ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION  63 
should be free from government interference.142  Therefore, the crucial 
question the Court needed to answer in Glover was whether Mehrer had 
reasonable suspicion to stop the driver of Glover’s vehicle—not whether 
there was reasonable suspicion to stop Glover himself.143   
2. The Court Failed to Require the Officer to Articulate Specific 
Facts to Demonstrate Reasonable Suspicion 
The Court departed from the precedent in Fourth Amendment 
reasonable suspicion cases—officers must point to specific and articulable 
facts to support their inferences.144  The reasonable suspicion inquiry is 
inherently fact-specific and does not recognize bare assumptions.145  A 
specific and articulable fact “is one that adds to the likelihood of criminal 
activity, given the other facts also observed.”146  It is based on articulable 
circumstances available to the officer at the time of the incident—not 
inarticulable circumstances or ex post evidence.147  In Brown v. Texas,148 the 
officer explained that the individual’s behavior “‘looked suspicious,’” but the 
officer failed to “point to any facts supporting that conclusion.”149  Similarly, 
in Glover, Mehrer assumed the owner of the car was also the driver, but 
Mehrer did not “point to any facts supporting that conclusion.”150  At the time 
                                                          
 142. Glover, 422 P.3d at 70; see Brief of the Rutherford Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 9, Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (No. 18-556) (“Mr. Glover was thus 
entitled to the benefit of this presumption until it could be shown through specific, articulable 
evidence that there was reason to believe he was committing a criminal act.”). 
 143. Glover, 422 P.3d at 68 (emphasis added). 
 144. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
 145. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (holding officers must have 
“articulable reasons” or “founded suspicions” from the “totality of the circumstances—the whole 
picture”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 217 
(1983) (explaining reasonable suspicion deals with probabilities but every action “must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949))); see also 
Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (requiring officers to articulate “objective facts” to demonstrate their 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is present); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27  (explaining reasonable 
suspicion is more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’”).  
 146. See Johnson, supra note 145, at 217 (emphasis added).  
 147. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51–52 (explaining there were no “circumstances preceding the 
officers’ detention” that justified reasonable suspicion that the individual was involved in criminal 
activity); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1153 
(2012) [hereinafter Police Efficiency] (noting the Terry doctrine requires officers to base suspicions 
on specific and particular facts for the purpose of “prevent[ing] policing based upon stereotypes of 
criminality”); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886 n. 11 (1975) (rejecting 
the presence of after-the-fact justifications); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (asking “whether the officer’s 
action was justified at its inception” (emphasis added)).  
 148. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
 149. Id. at 52. 
 150. Id.; see Brief of Professor Andrew Manuel Crespo as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Affirmance at 22, Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (No. 18-556) [hereinafter Brief of 
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of the incident in Glover, Mehrer only knew the registered owner of the 
pickup truck had a revoked driver’s license.151  Mehrer needed to first point 
to specific and articulable facts linking the driver of the vehicle as the 
registered owner.152  Without the officer offering “some explanation of why 
[the officer] regarded the conduct as suspicious,” the Court has “no ability to 
review the officer’s action.”153 
3. The Court Failed to Consider an Individual’s Fourth Amendment 
Privacy Interest 
Law enforcement has a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified 
to drive are operating motor vehicles, but that interest needs to be properly 
balanced with an individual’s privacy interest.154  Importantly, many people 
choose to drive deliberately—they seek to enjoy a “greater sense of security 
and privacy” in their car than they would on a bus or sidewalk.155  In Glover, 
the Court failed to consider “the gravity of the crime under investigation and 
the privacy intrusion resulting from the police activity.”156  Consequently, the 
Court gave officers the opportunity to further intrude on individual privacy 
rights, specifically of those who borrow cars where the owner of the car has 
a revoked license.157  An investigatory stop that “is not based on objective 
                                                          
Professor Crespo] (explaining that instead of presenting facts the “State opted to draft a stipulation 
of facts that contain[ed] no information whatsoever” proving that the owner was the driver).   
 151. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020). 
 152. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 153. Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 111, 816 A.2d 901, 908 (Md. 2003); see Margaret Raymond, 
Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in 
Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO STATE L.J. 99, 142 (1999) (finding judicial oversight 
and supervision is possible because “it requires the officer to proffer an articulable justification that 
can be meaningfully reviewed”). 
 154. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976) (explaining that when assessing the 
reasonableness of the officer’s conduct “it is necessary ‘first to focus upon the governmental interest 
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private 
citizen’” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534–535 (1976)); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (“An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all 
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to 
government regulation.”). 
 155. Delaware, 440 U.S. at 662.  But see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (finding 
there is a diminished expectation of privacy surrounding the automobile). 
 156. Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407, 463 
(2006); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1974) (balancing the public 
interest against “the interference with individual liberty that results when an officer stops an 
automobile and questions its occupants”).  
 157. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
majority’s distinction between revocation and suspension may not hold up in other 
jurisdictions . . . . Whether the majority’s ‘common sense’ assumptions apply outside of Kansas is 
thus open to challenge.”); The Rise of the One Car Family, NATIONWIDE (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://blog.nationwide.com/one-car-family/ (finding many teenagers are “content with a car-free 
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criteria” creates a greater “risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices.”158  
Therefore, an officer should balance the impact of the intrusion against the 
resulting social harm; there is likely little social harm from a failure to stop 
an individual with a suspended or revoked driver’s license, but doing so 
creates a situation where the intrusion could end up being large.159  For 
example, an officer that does not confirm the identity of a driver could end 
up pulling over someone who is driving their parent’s car, resulting in an 
innocent individual being subjected to a stop and potentially a search.160  
Additionally, the harm in failing to investigate an unlicensed driver is likely 
small because the majority of license suspensions or revocations stem from 
the failure to pay fines.161  In contrast, in a situation where an officer has a 
hunch that an individual entering the airport has a bomb, the resulting harm 
would greatly outweigh the impact of the intrusion.162  Ultimately, an 
individual who borrows a car should not lose all expectation of privacy 
simply because the owner of the car has a revoked license.163   
In an opportunity to clarify the reasonable suspicion doctrine, the Court 
further blurred the reasonable suspicion standard and established that an 
officer’s assumption provides the basis for reasonable suspicion if there is no 
information to negate the assumption.164  Significantly, the Court departed 
from requiring officers to articulate facts and inferences to support their 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.165  Importantly, the Court granted 
“yet another ‘constitutional’ set of circumstances upon which the police may 
                                                          
lifestyle” and likely will not own their own car because of the rise in self-driving cars and ride 
sharing services); supra text accompanying note 90. 
 158. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). 
 159. See e.g., Lerner, supra note 156, at 466 (explaining an officer that suspects an individual 
with a gun results in an intrusion that is likely small but “the social harm that would result from a 
failure to stop the particular crime is great”). 
 160. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 161. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1192 (Kagan, J., concurring) (noting that studies suggest that most 
license suspensions relate to being poor, not driving behaviors); Suspended or Revoked License, 
DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://dmv.dc.gov/service/suspended-or-revoked-license (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2020) (finding failure to make child support payments as a reason for having a driver’s 
license revoked); see Jon A. Carnegie & Robert J. Eger, Reasons for Driver License Suspension, 
Recidivism, and Crash Involvement Among Drivers with Suspended/Revoked Licenses, NAT’L 
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. 1, 7 (Jan. 2009), 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/811092_driver-license.pdf (finding the 
most common reasons for license suspensions include failure to comply with child support, maintain 
proper insurance, alcohol or drug-related offenses by minors, and failure to pay court fines). 
 162. Lerner, supra note 156, at 466. 
 163. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (emphasizing traveling by car as “a basic, 
pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, and 
leisure activities” and that “[m]any people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking 
on the streets”). 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 165. See supra Section IV.A.2. 
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depend in their ever-vigilant quest to arbitrarily enforce the power granted to 
them by the courts.”166  The more the Court grants law enforcement this 
power, the more the Fourth Amendment erodes, and inevitably officers may 
stop more innocent individuals.167 
B.  The Court Wrongfully Ignored Law Enforcement’s Primary 
Responsibility and Discouraged Law Enforcement Officers from 
Further Investigating 
In Glover, the Court ignored the experience and specialized training that 
officers receive and failed to require officers to do what they are more than 
capable of doing—further investigate potential criminal activity and traffic 
violations.168  The courts defer to law enforcement in a reasonable suspicion 
analysis “because they have the knowledge, the expertise, and, ultimately, 
the responsibility for combatting crime,”169 especially in situations where the 
activity “might well be unremarkable in one instance . . . while quite unusual 
in another.”170  When an officer learns that the owner of a vehicle has a 
revoked or suspended license, it is entirely possible that either the owner is 
continuing to drive or that someone else is driving the owner’s vehicle.171  As 
                                                          
 166. Hoehl, supra note 139, at 146. 
 167. See Amie Stepanovich, Fourth Amendment Eroded, REASON (Jan. 2014), 
https://reason.com/2013/12/29/fourth-amendment-eroded/ (“[G]overnment lawyers have argued 
repeatedly that [the Fourth Amendment] right should be limited, and the Supreme Court has often 
agreed.”); see also Hoehl, supra note 139, at 146–47 (“Unless the courts are willing to backpedal 
and return to the original, narrowly circumscribed holding of Terry, citizens on the street will 
continue to see their rights and expectations gradually fade into nonexistence.”). 
 168. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The 
consequence of the majority’s approach is to absolve officers from any responsibility to investigate 
the identity of a driver where feasible.”); see also Lerner, supra note 156, at 472–73 (explaining 
that officers are the ones that track down a criminal while respecting the rights of innocents but to 
make this happen depends upon “the quality of police recruits, the nature of their training, [and] the 
competence of the police command structure”). 
 169. David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped 
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 665 (1994); see Police Efficiency, supra note 147, at 1156 (“With the 
proper training and experience, officers may learn to make accurate judgments about when an 
individual’s actions denote criminality . . . . [A]n appropriately trained and experienced officer is 
likely more proficient than the courts at determining whether a particular set of circumstances is 
suspicious.”).  But see L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 2035, 2068 (2011) [hereinafter Arrest Efficiency] (“[O]fficers may be more likely to be 
influenced by the operation of implicit biases than civilians, which may cause officers to incorrectly 
interpret ambiguous behavior as suspicious when engaged in by blacks as opposed to whites.”). 
 170. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 275, 276 (2002). 
 171. See New Report Finds New York Has Severe Racial Disparities in Traffic Enforcement and 
Driver’s License Suspensions, FINES AND FEES JUST. CTR. (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/2020/02/18/new-report-finds-new-york-has-severe-racial-
disparities-in-traffic-enforcement-and-drivers-license-suspensions/ [hereinafter New York Racial 
Disparities] (“Driving is such a necessity that [seventy-five] percent of people continue to drive 
after their license gets suspended.”); Bruce Schaller, In a Reversal, ‘Car Rich’ Households Are 
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a result, these are situations where the Court has indicated it is perfectly 
reasonable for the officer to confirm the owner is not behind the wheel.172  In 
this case, anyone could have been driving Glover’s vehicle.173  However, the 
Court held Mehrer to a lower standard than the Court originally established 
in Terry.174  In doing so, the Court rewarded law enforcement for poor police 
work and discouraged them from investigating potential criminal activity or 
traffic violations further.175 
Law enforcement has the responsibility of articulating inferences, 
especially in this “type of geographically localized inquiry.”176  By relieving 
officers of their primary duty to articulate inferences,177 the Court ignored 
that reasonable minds may differ on what may be common sense in this 
particular situation178 and, therefore, some individuals may assume the 
opposite—cars are commonly driven by individuals other than the registered 
owner.179  The Court failed to consider that the commonsense inference 
                                                          
Growing, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Jan. 7, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-07/despite-uber-and-lyft-urban-car-
ownership-is-growing (finding in Seattle there has been a twenty-three percent increase in “car-
light” households, meaning households with fewer vehicles than workers). 
 172. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1196 (“[T]here are countless other instances where officers have 
been able to ascertain the identity of a driver from a distance and make out their approximate age 
and gender.”); supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra text accompanying note 171. 
 174. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 22 (1968) (requiring law enforcement to “point to specific 
and articulable facts” because “[a]nything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally 
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches”). 
 175. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1197 (noting that the majority’s “logic has thus made the [s]tate’s task 
all but automatic,” which is something “[t]hat has never been the law, and it never should be”). 
 176. Id. at 1196; see supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Brief of Professor Crespo, supra note 150, at 23–24 (“[A]ll one needs to do is count 
how many times vehicles reportedly registered to unlicensed drivers are actually driven by those 
individuals when such vehicles are stopped in the relevant geographic area.”). 
 178. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1192 (Kagan, J., concurring) (explaining it may be common sense 
to “think that a person told not to drive on pain of criminal penalty would obey the order”); see also 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1979) (“It seems common sense that the percentage of 
all drivers on the road who are driving without a license is very small . . . .”); Brief of Professor 
Crespo, supra note 150, at 24  (alteration in original) (explaining that from an officer’s “‘hit rate’ 
one can ‘compute the likelihood that any particular [stop] will result . . . in the discovery of 
particular kinds of evidence,’ including an unlicensed driver sitting behind the wheel” (quoting 
Sharad Goel, Maya Perelman, Ravi Shroff & David Alan Sklansky, Combatting Police 
Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181, 187 (2017)). 
 179. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191 (noting that “[f]amilies share cars; friends borrow them”); 
State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 67 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 
(2020) (explaining the trial court judge found it was common for individuals other than the 
registered owner to drive a vehicle because the judge herself had three cars registered in her name 
that she, her daughter, and her husband drove); HUB SmartCoverage Team, Does the Car Owner 
Have to be The Primary Driver?, HUB SMART COVERAGE (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://www.hubsmartcoverage.ca/blog/does-car-owner-have-be-primary-driver/ (acknowledging 
the primary driver is not always the owner of the car, especially in situations where parents let a 
teenager drive an older car or when people with poor credit are unable to purchase their own 
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drawn may “depend on a number of different circumstances.”180  The 
probability of a non-owner driving a vehicle varies between city and even 
neighborhood,181 and there are many reasons why licenses are suspended—
many of them unrelated to driving.182  Consequently, not requiring law 
enforcement to demonstrate specific and articulable facts—when the 
officer’s training has taught them to do exactly that—rewards officers for 
what the Court has previously recognized as “poor police work.”183 
Most importantly, the rule adopted by the Court disincentivizes officers 
from investigating further because, ultimately, if they did, it could undermine 
reasonable suspicion.184  If an officer runs an individual’s license plate and 
learns that the registered owner has a revoked license, the officer will not 
want to search for other information since “the presence of additional facts 
might dispel reasonable suspicion.”185  The Court implied that officers can 
rely solely on assumptions, as long as no facts are present to negate the 
                                                          
vehicle); see also I. Wagner, Number of Vehicles Per Household in the United States from 2001 to 
2017, STATISTA (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/551403/number-of-vehicles-
per-household-in-the-united-states/ (finding that there are about 1.88 vehicles per U.S. household). 
 180. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); see supra note 62 and accompanying text; see e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 
276 (2002) (explaining a driver’s behavior on a busy San Francisco highway might be 
unremarkable, while quite unusual in another instance such as on a remote portion of rural 
southeastern Arizona); see also Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1198 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the 
terminology about revoked versus suspended varies from state to state).  
 181. Orin S. Kerr, Reasonable Suspicion From Driver to Car: A Few Thoughts on Kansas v. 
Glover, REASON (Oct. 13, 2019, 7:25 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2019/10/31/reasonable-
suspicion-from-driver-to-car-a-few-thoughts-on-kansas-v-glover/.  Family size may change the 
likelihood that a non-owner is driving a car.  Id.  For example, a family living in Washington, D.C. 
where the percentage of households with children is 18.9%, and a family living in Arlington, 
Virginia, where the percentage of households with children is 33.8%.  Richard Florida, Which U.S. 
Cities Have the Most Families With Kids?, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Jan. 16, 2019, 9:25 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-16/which-u-s-cities-have-the-most-families-
with-kids.  It is more likely that a teenager is driving the family car in Arlington, Virginia than in 
Washington, D.C.  See Kerr, supra note 181. 
 182. See Carnegie & Eger, supra note 161, at 7 (finding the most common reasons for license 
suspensions include failure to comply with child support, maintain proper insurance, alcohol or 
drug-related offenses by minors, and failure to pay court fines). 
 183. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (emphasizing it would have been poor police work 
if the officer with thirty years of experience did not further investigate the two men standing on the 
street corner, pacing, and pausing to stare in the same store window for an extended amount of 
time). 
 184. See State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 70–71 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 
140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (observing that creating a rule that does not require officers to have a 
particular and individualized suspicion that the registered owner was driving “motivates officers to 
avoid confirming the identity of the driver because learning facts that suggest the registered owner 
is not driving undermines reasonable suspicion”). 
 185. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191 (majority opinion). 
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inference.186  More significantly, the Court provided that the reasonable 
suspicion analysis includes an officer’s lack of information as part of the 
totality of the circumstances.187  As a result, the Court shifted further from 
the requirement that officers point to specific and articulable facts188 and 
opened the door for officers to intrude further on an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment privacy interest.189 
C.  The Majority Failed to Acknowledge the Negative Implications of 
its Holding on Disadvantaged Communities 
In a time when police misconduct190 and racial injustice191 is prevalent 
around the country, the Court “paved the road to finding reasonable suspicion 
based on nothing more than a demographic profile.”192  Law enforcement 
officers already have considerable discretion in deciding to stop citizens, and 
they should not have any more leeway to justify their constant stops of people 
of color.193  Before Glover, it was abundantly clear that law enforcement 
officers stopped and searched non-white individuals more often than white 
individuals.194  Indeed, this disparity is more pronounced in the Black 
community, resulting in “a phenomenon so pervasive, it has earned its own 
                                                          
 186. See id. (“Deputy Mehrer possessed no exculpatory information—let alone sufficient 
information to rebut the reasonable inference that Glover was driving his own truck—and thus the 
stop was justified.”). 
 187. See supra note 186. 
 188. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining the majority’s 
opinion “breaks from settled doctrine and dramatically alters” the evidence the State needs to prove 
reasonable suspicion). 
 189. See infra Section IV.C. 
 190. See Khaleda Rahman, From George Floyd to Breonna Taylor, Remembering the Black 
People Killed By Police in 2020, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 29, 2020, 12:14 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/george-floyd-breonna-taylor-black-people-police-killed-1556285 
(noting that many of the events in 2020 “served as a wake-up call for many about the reality of 
police brutality,” however many of the protests “did little to stop Black people disproportionately 
dying at the hands of police officers”); Associated Press, Americans’ Opinions About Police 
Brutality and Racial Injustice Have Moved Dramatically, MARKET WATCH (July 4, 2020, 1:03 
PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/americans-opinions-about-police-brutality-and-racial-
injustice-have-moved-dramatically-2020-07-04 (“About half of American adults believe police 
violence against the public is a ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ serious problem . . . .”). 
 191. See Associated Press, supra note 190 (stating sixty-one percent of Americans today “say 
police in most communities are more likely to use deadly force against a Black person than a white 
person”). 
 192. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1197. 
 193. See Arrest Efficiency, supra note 169, at 2062–63 (explaining the reasonable suspicion test 
allows “officers to act on their interpretation of ambiguous behaviors, [thus] the reasonable 
suspicion test actually permits, rather than prevents, actions based upon racial hunches”).  
 194. See Findings, STAN. OPEN POLICING PROJECT, https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/ 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2021) (finding in almost every jurisdiction Black and Hispanic drivers are 
searched more often after the stop than white drivers). 
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catch phrase: driving while Black.”195  Importantly, now officers are given 
further discretion that could be used in a way that has the practical effect of 
harming non-white individuals to a greater degree.196  In the wake of racial 
injustice across the country, courts should be sensitive to the fact that often 
police encounters can be difficult for minority populations.197  This issue has 
become so important that some states are taking steps to limit what the police 
can rely on to stop individuals and what they can do once they stop 
individuals.198   
As a result of Glover, law enforcement now has more discretion to 
perform a traffic stop and search individuals in disadvantaged 
communities.199  One reason for this is because a majority of states enforce 
driver’s license suspensions for unpaid fines and fees.200  Individuals in poor 
communities are less likely to be able to pay court fines and fees, which “can 
set off a chain of problems.”201  These individuals often must choose between 
                                                          
 195. Philip V. McHarris, ‘I Experience a Hollowing Fear Any Time I’m Stopped by Police,’ 
NATION (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/driving-black-police-stops/; 
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 196. See supra Section IV.A. 
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(Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/09/03/police-pretext-traffic-stops-need-to-end-some-lawmakers-say. 
 198. Id.  For example, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled in State v. Arreola-Botello that “police 
could no longer pull someone over for a broken taillight or failure to signal, then ask unrelated 
questions, such as asking for consent to search the car for illegal drugs or guns.”  Id. 
 199. See Arrest Efficiency, supra note 169, at 2067 (“[A]n officer patrolling a poor, urban, 
majority-black neighborhood is more prone to judge ambiguous behaviors as suspicious, causing 
him to stop more individuals who are innocent.”); Ahmed Jallow, Police More Likely to Stop, 
Search a Black Driver in Burlington Area: Times-News Investigation, TIMES NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020, 
7:01 AM), https://www.thetimesnews.com/story/news/2020/10/21/police-more-likely-stop-search-
black-people-driving-burlington/5956475002/ (finding that once a law enforcement officer has 
pulled someone over, it is about fifty percent more likely that the officer searches the vehicle if the 
driver is Black compared to if they are white). 
 200. See Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Driven By Dollars: A State-by-State Analysis of Driver’s 
License Suspension Laws for Failure to Pay Court Debt, LEGAL AID JUST. CTR. 1, 1 (Sept. 15, 
2017), https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf (“Forty-
three states and the District of Columbia use driver’s license suspension to coerce payment of 
government debts arising out of traffic or criminal convictions.”). 
 201. Joseph Shapiro, How Driver’s License Suspensions Unfairly Target The Poor, NPR (Jan. 
5, 2015, 3:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/05/372691918/how-drivers-license-suspensions-
unfairly-target-the-poor (finding people with lack of income constantly accumulate a series of 
tickets); see Stephanie Agnew, Court Costs, Fines, and Fees are Bad Policy, CHICAGO APPLESEED 
CTR. FOR FAIR CTS., http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/072220-court-costs-fines-fees-are-bad-
policy/ (last visited June 10, 2021) (finding that any monetary sanction in the United States punishes 
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refraining from driving, and jeopardizing their jobs, or continuing to drive 
and risking “jail time and more unaffordable fines.”202  Therefore, low-
income individuals are more likely to have their licenses suspended for 
failing to pay fees.203  Additionally, in disadvantaged communities, there is a 
higher chance that the driver of the vehicle is not the owner of the vehicle.204  
Individuals in low-income communities are less likely to have more than one 
vehicle per household,205 and therefore it is more likely that in these 
communities family members are sharing cars.206  In conjunction with this, 
communities of color will also be disproportionately impacted by the Glover 
ruling because Black and Hispanic individuals are more likely to be poor than 
white individuals.207 
Although the Court’s holding does not explicitly give police officers the 
ability to stop suspects on bare assumptions, the Court’s reluctance to 
explicitly reject bare assumptions will have the same effect.208  After Glover, 
police officers will be more likely to make stops based solely on their 
assumptions—possibly influenced by implicit racial bias—rather than risk 
stumbling upon exculpatory evidence to the contrary.209  Disadvantaged 
                                                          
a person solely based on their wealth); see, e.g., New York Racial Disparities, supra note 171 (“For 
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historic-lows-in-2019.html (finding that in 2019 the poverty rate for Blacks was 18.8% and 15.7% 
for Hispanics compared to 7.3% for non-Hispanic Whites). 
 208. See Hoehl, supra note 139, at 136 (“To a seasoned police officer, almost any conduct may 
be considered indicative of wrongdoing.”); Erin Killeen, Traffic Stops and Discriminatory Policing 
in the United States, GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y (Apr. 26, 2018) (“It is well established that 
police use these minor traffic violations as a pretext to stop drivers and search their cars for more 
serious legal violations.”). 
 209. See Arrest Efficiency, supra note 169, at 2062 (noting “science demonstrates that race can 
affect an officer’s interpretation of ambiguous behavior”); Police Efficiency, supra note 147, at 1151 
(“The problem is that implicit biases may cause police officers to pay more attention to Blacks than 
to Whites and to interpret the behaviors of Blacks as suspicious more readily than the identical 
behaviors of Whites.”); Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 
87 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 876, 876 (2004) (“Not only is the association between Blacks 
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communities have often been viewed and classified as “high crime” 
neighborhoods making them high targets for law enforcement.210  Officers 
have a considerable amount of discretion in considering whether reasonable 
suspicion exists, and often factors such as race, location, or the time of day 
are at the forefront of the reasonable suspicion analysis.211  Nonetheless, the 
Glover court failed to require officers to articulate specific facts and, thus, 
granted law enforcement additional discretion to act upon their implicit 
biases and further target disadvantaged communities.212  Consequently, 
individuals in low-income areas and communities of color are continuing to 
be “stripped of their fundamental constitutional right to go about their 
business.”213 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Kansas v. Glover, the Supreme Court found that when the officer did 
not have any information indicating that the owner was not the driver, the 
stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.214  By departing from the 
original reasonable suspicion analysis developed in Terry v. Ohio, 215 the 
Court further expanded law enforcement’s ability to conduct investigatory 
stops.216  Despite correctly acknowledging that officers may rely on 
commonsense inferences, the Court ignored law enforcement’s primary 
responsibility to further investigate potential criminal activity and traffic 
violations and, more importantly, discouraged officers from doing so.217  
Ultimately, the Court declined to consider the additional implications of this 
holding, specifically failing to consider how the ruling negatively impacts 
disadvantaged communities.218   
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